Appeal 2006-3331
Application 10/829,797
justified. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA
1969). We do not see where the Specification requires us to interpret “personal
identification access information” as being limited to “a secret protected number.”
As such, we give this phrase its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
claim terms used and consistent with the Specification to mean information used to
authenticate a person as someone who has the right to make use of3 a checking
account.
The Appellant further argues that the claimed “service provider” should be
interpreted as “a company which gives its subscribers access to the internet”
(Appeal Br. 12). Again, we find nothing in the Appellant’s Specification that
would require us to interpret this claim term so narrowly. In particular, the
Specification does not include the definition proffered by the Appellant (Finding of
Fact 3). The Appellant attempts to show that the term “service provider” has
acquired an accepted definition in the internet art (Evidence Appendix). However,
it appears that the Appellant is relying on definitions of “Internet Service
Providers” (e.g., those companies who business it is to provide customers with
access to the internet). That is clearly not what is intended by the Appellant’s
claimed “service provider.” The “service provider” of the claimed invention is not
providing a retailer with access to the internet; rather, the claimed service provider
compares stored information with received information and transmits a verification
3 A common and ordinary meaning of “access”, as a noun, is the “ability or right to
approach, enter, exit, communicate with, or make use of: has access to the
restricted area; has access to classified material.” American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), found at www.bartelby.com.
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