Ex Parte Vargas et al - Page 11



            Appeal 2006-3416                                                                                 
            Application 10/884,751                                                                           
            description support for a later-claimed genus including that species); see also In re            
            Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382, 178 USPQ 279, 284 (CCPA 1973), “the case law                        
            does ‘not compel the conclusion that a description of a species always constitutes a             
            description of a genus of which it is a part”’ either.  Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at              
            1479, 45 USPQ2d at 1503 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,                
            119 F.3d 1559, 1568, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also In re                      
            Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 69 USPQ2d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Johnson Worldwide                        
            Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1613 (Fed. Cir.                       
            1999) (explaining that Gentry Gallery concerns “the situation where the patent's                 
            disclosure makes crystal clear that a particular (i.e., narrow) understanding of a               
            claim term is an ‘essential element of [the inventor's] invention’”); and Tronzo v.              
            Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 47 USPQ2d 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  “It is a truism that              
            a claim need not be limited to a preferred embodiment. However, in a given case,                 
            the scope of the right to exclude may be limited by a narrow disclosure.”  Gentry                
            Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479, 45 USPQ2d at 1503.  Each case must be decided on its                  
            own facts.  In re Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1382, 178 USPQ at 284.                                     
                   On the facts before us, the Specification describes in every embodiment that              
            the second flange is necessary to secure the graft vessel to the target vessel.  If only         
            a single flange were used, it is not clear how the graft vessel would be prevented               
            from simply passing through the opening in the target vessel.  As such, although                 
            the Appellants’ Specification does not explicitly disavow or disclaim an                         
            embodiment having a single flange, neither does the Specification present any                    
            alternative to a device having two flanges that would achieve the function of the                

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