Appeal 2007-0879
Application 09/793,209
page 5, lines 14-18, respectively. Appellants refer to the former passage as a
part of the disclosure respecting the structure associated with the “means for
mixing” limitation (Br. 4). Appellants do not refer to the latter passage as
part of the disclosure respecting the structure associated with the “means for
measuring the mixture state” limitation (id. 4-5).
Furthermore, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner does not
determine whether claims 15 and 22 are subject to § 112, sixth paragraph, or
provide analysis supporting the findings of “equivalency” between the
“means” limitations in the claims and the disclosures of the references.
Indeed, it is not clear that the Examiner’s findings of “equivalency” are
based on analysis of the corresponding structure in the Specification and
equivalents thereof as required by this statutory provision.
The resolution of the issues with respect to the rejection of claims 15,
17, 18, and 22 through 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) advanced on appeal
requires that the “means” claim language in these claims must first be
interpreted by giving the claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the written description provided in Appellants’ Specification
as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art. See In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account
whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be
afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
specification.”); In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192-95, 29 USPQ2d
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