Ex Parte Satake et al - Page 5

                Appeal 2007-0879                                                                               
                Application 09/793,209                                                                         

                page 5, lines 14-18, respectively.  Appellants refer to the former passage as a                
                part of the disclosure respecting the structure associated with the “means for                 
                mixing” limitation (Br. 4).  Appellants do not refer to the latter passage as                  
                part of the disclosure respecting the structure associated with the “means for                 
                measuring the mixture state” limitation (id. 4-5).                                             
                      Furthermore, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner does not                         
                determine whether claims 15 and 22 are subject to § 112, sixth paragraph, or                   
                provide analysis supporting the findings of “equivalency” between the                          
                “means” limitations in the claims and the disclosures of the references.                       
                Indeed, it is not clear that the Examiner’s findings of “equivalency” are                      
                based on analysis of the corresponding structure in the Specification and                      
                equivalents thereof as required by this statutory provision.                                   
                      The resolution of the issues with respect to the rejection of claims 15,                 
                17, 18, and 22 through 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) advanced on appeal                          
                requires that the “means” claim language in these claims must first be                         
                interpreted by giving the claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation                 
                consistent with the written description provided in Appellants’ Specification                  
                as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art.  See In re                    
                Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir.                             
                1997) (“[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the                           
                broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they                       
                would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account                   
                whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be                          
                afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s                               
                specification.”); In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192-95, 29 USPQ2d                        


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