Appeal 2007-0879
Application 09/793,209
1845, 1848-50 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he ‘broadest reasonable
interpretation’ that an examiner may give means-plus-function language is
that statutorily mandated in [35 U.S.C. § 112,] paragraph six.”); In re Zletz,
893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“During
patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as
their terms reasonably allow. When the applicant states the meaning that the
claim terms are intended to have, the claims are examined with that
meaning, in order to achieve a complete exploration of the applicant’s
invention and its relation to the prior art.”) (citing Prater, 415 F.2d 1393,
1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969)).
In view of the “means” recitations, claims 15, 17, 18, and 22 through
25 must be interpreted with respect to whether any or all of the “means”
limitations specify a function without defining structure sufficient to satisfy
that function. If any or all of the “means” limitations specify only a
function, the strictures of 35 U. S. C. § 112, sixth paragraph, apply to the
limitation(s). See Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1208, 64 USPQ2d 1812, 1822-23 (Fed. Cir 2002), and cases cited
therein. Claims containing “means” language complying with this statutory
provision must be construed as limited to the “corresponding structure”
disclosed in the written description in the Specification and “equivalents”
thereof. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1192-95, 29 USPQ2d at 1848-50.
The “corresponding structure” is that “structure in the written
description necessary to perform that function [citation omitted],” that is,
“‘the specification . . . clearly links or associates that structure to the
function recited in the claims.’ [Citation omitted.]” Texas Digital Systems,
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