Appeal 2007-1098
Application 10/026,059
1 . . . Claim 15 includes limitations similar to the limitations of
2 claim 1. Therefore, the remarks stated above with respect to claim 14
3 and Luce and Kirkpatrick also apply to claim 15.
4
5 (Appeal Br. 10).
6
7 Second, I am not convinced by the explanation in the Majority’s opinion that
8 paragraph six (6) of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the precedent cited relating thereto, are
9 implicated by the language of Claim 1 of this appeal and justify the Majority’s
10 narrow interpretation of the scope and content of the claimed subject matter. If
11 paragraph 6 of § 112 is not implicated in this case, and in my view it is not, then
12 the Majority erred in its determination of the full scope and content of the subject
13 matter defined by Claim 1. The Majority limited the “structure that surrounds the
14 enclosure and that reduces a thermal drift of the electronic component by
15 increasing a thermal mass of the electronic component” of the Claim 1 circuit
16 exclusively to the named structures described in the specification selected from the
17 group consisting of “a metal case around the enclosure” (Claim 3) and “a ceramic
18 case around the enclosure” (Claim 4).
19 Generally, “in proceedings before the PTO, claims in an application are to
20 be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.”
21 In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548, 218 USPQ 385, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1983). While it
22 is proper to interpret the claim language, and thus determine the full scope and
23 content of the subject matter claimed, in light of the specification, it is generally
24 improper to read limitations found in the supporting specification into the claims
25 and limit the scope and content of the claimed subject matter in accordance
26 therewith. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404, 162 USPQ 541, 550 (CCPA 1969).
14
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