Ex Parte Eidson et al - Page 6


             Appeal 2007-1098                                                                                 
             Application 10/026,059                                                                           
         1         In the wake of Halliburton, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth                        
         2   paragraph, to permit the use of purely functional means-plus-function claim                      
         3   language, but expressly limited  the coverage of such functional language to only                
         4   the corresponding structure, materials, and acts disclosed in the specification and              
         5   equivalents thereof.  In Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 91 F.3d 1580,                   
         6   1582, 39 USPQ2d 1783, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the                        
         7   Federal Circuit explained:                                                                       
         8                As this court has observed, “[t]he record is clear on why                           
         9         paragraph six was enacted.”  In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189,                            
        10         1194, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1849 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc).  In                                 
        11         Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 71 USPQ                          
        12         175 (1946), the Supreme Court held invalid a claim that was drafted                        
        13         in means-plus-function fashion.  Congress enacted paragraph six,                           
        14         originally paragraph three, to overrule that holding.  In place of the                     
        15         Halliburton rule, Congress adopted a compromise solution, one that                         
        16         had support in the pre-Halliburton case law:  Congress permitted the                       
        17         use of purely functional language in claims, but it limited the breadth                    
        18         of such claim language by restricting its scope to the structure                           
        19         disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.  (Citations                        
        20         omitted.)                                                                                  
        21                                                                                                    
        22         Accordingly, the above-quoted functional clauses of claims 1 and 15 violate                
        23   the prohibition against functional claiming and thus would render claims 1 and 15                
        24   unpatentable under the principles expressed by the Supreme Court in Halliburton,                 
        25   supra, unless the recitations are means-plus-function clauses under 35 U.S.C.                    
        26   § 112, sixth paragraph.  Here, we do construe them as such.  Each clause is entirely             
        27   functional, without recitation of any structure.  The claim element is precisely                 
        28   expressed simply as some means, whatever means, for performing a function, only                  
        29   without using the word “means.”  The sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is not so                
        30   rigid as to require literal usage of the word “means” to invoke its application.  See            
        31   Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1584, 39 USPQ2d at 1786.                                                   

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