William H. Adair and Patricia Adair - Page 31

                                                  31                                                    
                  The parties have agreed and stipulated:                                               
                        If Mr. Adair was not, during the taxable years at                               
                  issue, "an employee of the United States" within the                                  
                  meaning of I.R.C. section 911(b)(1)(B)(ii), the                                       
                  compensation he received for his work for NATO during                                 
                  those years was "foreign earned income", as that term                                 
                  is defined in I.R.C. section 911(b)(1)(A).                                            
                  We treat this stipulation by the parties as a concession by                           
            respondent that since we have found that petitioner was not an                              
            employee of the United States, his compensation, both pay and                               
            allowances, as a member of NATO, are entitled to exemption from                             
            United States income tax under section 911(a)(1), cf. Walker v.                             
            Commissioner, 101 T.C. 537, 550 (1993), subject, of course, to                              
            the other applicable restrictions of section 911, including the                             
            dollar limitations on foreign earned income in section 911(b)(2)                            
            for the years in question.  Although petitioners claimed an                                 
            exclusion from income for the year 1988 on account of housing,                              
            presumably under section 911(a)(2), and although respondent's                               
            statutory notice of deficiency disallowed this claimed exclusion                            
            as well as the claimed exclusion for salary under section                                   
            911(a)(1), petitioners did not allege error on respondent's part                            
            because of the disallowance of this housing exclusion, and                                  
            alleged no facts or argument, either in their petition or on                                
            brief, in support of the proposition that such housing exclusion                            
            for 1988 should be allowed.  We conclude that petitioners have                              
            abandoned the issue.                                                                        







Page:  Previous  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011