- 8 -
We see no need to dissect the various elements of equitable
estoppel6 except to note that it is applied against respondent
with the utmost caution and restraint. Norfolk S. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 13, 60 (1995) modified on another issue
104 T.C. 417 (1981); Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214-215
(1981), affd. 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A no-change letter
simply does not provide the necessary foundation for estopping
respondent herein. Opine Timber Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 700
(1975), affd. without opinion 552 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977);
Lawton v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 725 (1951); cf. Estate of
Freeland v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 1968),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1966-283.7 Moreover, petitioner's basis for
claiming detrimental reliance on the no-change letter, a key
condition which a taxpayer claiming estoppel of the Government
must satisfy, Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 215, is totally
inadequate. The extent of petitioner's argument in respect of
reliance are statements that he believed in the "authenticity" of
6 The traditional elements of equitable estoppel include: (1)
Conduct constituting a representation of material fact; (2)
actual or imputed knowledge of such fact by the representor; (3)
ignorance of the fact by the representee; (4) actual or imputed
expectation by the representor that the representee will act in
reliance upon the representation; (5) actual reliance thereon;
and (6) detriment on the part of the representee. Graff v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, 761 (1980), affd. per curiam 673 F.2d
784 (5th Cir. 1982).
7 See also Feldman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-132; Dorl v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1973-145, affd. 507 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1974).
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