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the no-change letter, and that he requests we "allow him to
proceed with the remainder of his life unencumbered by the
effects of spurious and venal allegations concerning events
dating back 15 years which were reviewed for years resulting in
the issuance of the 'No Change Letter'." Clearly, these
assertions do not reflect any actions taken by petitioner in
reliance upon the no-change letter.
Petitioner also argues that he may rely upon the no-change
letter under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Under that
doctrine, "once an issue is actually and necessarily determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is
conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of
action involving a party to the prior litigation." Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Brotman v. Commissioner,
105 T.C. 141 (1995). The immediate point on which petitioner's
argument fails is that respondent is not a judicial body and
therefore is not a "court of competent jurisdiction". In any
event, our previous holding in respect of the equitable estoppel
effect of the no-change letter, see supra p. 8-9, is equally
applicable in respect of any claim of collateral estoppel.
Indeed, to hold otherwise would have the effect of according the
no-change letter the status of a closing agreement as to which
there are specific statutory requirements. See Freeland v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1966-283 n.10.
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