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Nor does the doctrine of collateral estoppel operate against
respondent with respect to the acquittal on the conspiracy
charge. There is a higher standard of proof in criminal
proceedings (beyond a reasonable doubt) than there is in this
civil proceeding (preponderance of the evidence), so that failure
of proof in the criminal proceeding does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that there will be a failure of proof herein. See
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-398 (1938); Neaderland
v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 639, 642-643 (2d Cir. 1970), affg. 52
T.C. 532 (1969); Traficant v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 501, 510 n.9
(1987), affd. 884 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover, acquittal
on the conspiracy charge does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that all the facts alleged were found in favor of
petitioner. See United States v. Levy, 803 F.2d 1390, 1400 (5th
Cir. 1986); Spear v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 984, 992-995 (1988).
Collateral estoppel applies only as to those issues which it can
be said were necessarily determined in the prior proceeding.
Montana v. United States, supra.
Petitioner's first motion to dismiss will be denied.
Motion to Dismiss for Double Jeopardy
Petitioner's second motion to dismiss is predicated on the
doctrine of double jeopardy. In a similar fashion as in the first
motion to dismiss, petitioner alleges he is being punished for
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