- 30 -
Finally, the dissent’s approach conflicts with our cases
involving litigation costs. In Estate of Hubberd v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 335, 338 (1992), we held that an estate is
a party eligible to be awarded litigation costs. In doing so, we
expressly recognized that
“Common sense compels a finding that an estate is
a 'party.' It is an entity which can be taxed, which
can earn income (which is taxed), which can sue, and
which can be sued. * * * In any event, the real party
in interest here is the estate which, by way of its
personal representative, is challenging the tax levied
against it.” [Id. (quoting Boatmen’s First Natl. Bank
v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 163, 169 (W.D. Mo.
1989)); emphasis added.]
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
adhered to this concept in Estate of Woll by Woll v. United
States, 44 F.3d 464, 467-468 (7th Cir. 1994). In holding that an
estate is a party eligible to recover attorney's fees, the court
stated:
Notably, the * * * [Equal Access to Justice Act]
does not list estates among the parties eligible to
recover litigation costs. However, seeing no reason to
treat estates differently from individuals, the Tax
Court, the Court of Claims, and at least two district
courts have concluded that estates should be permitted
to recover their costs despite statutory omission.
* * * [Id. at 467 (citing Estate of Hubberd v.
Commissioner, supra at 338-339); emphasis added.]
In the setting of a case in the U.S. Tax Court, the estate
and the decedent are the focus of the proceeding. In that
regard, it is likely that Courts of Appeals would treat the Court
Page: Previous 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011