Estate of Willis Edward Clack, Deceased, Marshall & Ilsley Trust Company, Co-Personal Representative, and Richard E. Clack, Co-Personal Representative - Page 36

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               PARKER, J., dissenting:  I think this Court was correct in             
          its interpretation of section 2056(b)(7) and correctly held that            
          the surviving spouse does not have a "qualifying income interest            
          for life" where passage of such income interest in the property             
          to the surviving spouse is contingent upon the executor's making            
          the QTIP election as to such property and therefore subject to              
          the executor's power to appoint the property to someone other               
          than the surviving spouse.  Thus such property is not "qualified            
          terminable interest property" even though the executor ultimately           
          makes the QTIP election.  Accordingly, I think this Court should            
          continue to follow its opinions in Estate of Clayton v.                     
          Commissioner, 97 T.C. 327 (1991), revd. 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.             
          1992); Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 678 (1992),             
          revd. 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); and Estate of Spencer v.                 
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-579, revd. 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir.              
          1995).                                                                      
               However, I agree with petitioner that if an appeal in this             
          case would lie to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth                  
          Circuit, this Court would be bound under the Golsen rule to                 
          follow the opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Estate of Robertson             
          v. Commissioner, supra.  Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742                
          (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).  For that reason, I            
          think this Court must address the venue issue, and under this               
          Court's special venue statute I would conclude that any appeal in           







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