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BEGHE, J., concurring: My first reaction to the case at
hand was that this Court's prior views, as expressed in our
opinions in Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 678
(1992), revd. 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994), Estate of Clayton v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 327 (1991), revd. 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
1992), and Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-
579, revd. 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995), have the better of the
arguments on the literal interpretation of the statutory
language. I also had (and continue to have) reservations about
the views, expressed by three Courts of Appeals, whose adoption
would require us to invalidate section 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3), Estate
Tax Regs., effective for estates of decedents dying after
March 1, 1994. Cf. Estate of Shelfer v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.
10, 28 n.6 (1994) (Beghe, J., dissenting).
On reflection, I think I see a principled justification for
changing my position on the merits. As explained in my dissent
in Estate of Shelfer, QTIP is an exception to an exception that
deserves a liberal construction. 103 T.C. at 26. This is
particularly so in the Clayton, Robertson, and Spencer situation,
as in the case at hand, because there is no loophole. Although I
agree with Judge Parker that executors don't need the post mortem
planning flexibility to choose who actually gets the property,
dissenting op. p. 45, I don't think that should be our concern;
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