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three Courts of Appeals disagree with us. Are we persuaded by
the reasoning of one or more of those Courts of Appeals or have
we today adopted a new exception to the Lawrence doctrine, that
when we have been overruled three times we will throw in the
towel? Because we are a trial court of national jurisdiction, we
enjoy an autonomy not enjoyed generally by Federal trial courts.
Because I am jealous of that autonomy, I would be slow to give it
up. As set forth in the next section of this opinion, I think
that we reached the right conclusion in Estate of Clayton v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 327 (1991), revd. 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
1992), Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 678 (1992),
revd. 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994), and Estate of Spencer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-579, revd. 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir.
1995). I would follow those decisions.
II. Qualified Terminable Interest Property
A. Introduction--Section 2056(b)(7) Is Unambiguous
We must determine whether the property passing from the
decedent to the marital trust is “qualified terminal interest
property”, as that term is used in section 2056(b)(7)(B)(i). If
it is not, then such property does not qualify for the marital
deduction provided for in section 2056(a). The distinguishing
feature of the decedent’s bequest to the marital trust is that it
is conditional on the decedent’s personal representative’s
electing to have section 2056(b)(7)(A) apply. If no election is
made, the marital trust receives nothing. If an election is
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