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limitations, including the terminable-interest rule.
These provisions may be imperfect devices to achieve
the desired end, but they are the means which Congress
chose. To the extent it was thought desirable to
modify the rigors of the terminable-interest rule,
exceptions to the rule were written into the Code.
Courts should hesitate to provide still another
exception by straying so far from the statutory
language as to allow a marital deduction for the
widow's allowance provided by the California statute.
The achievement of the purposes of the marital
deduction is dependent to a great degree upon the
careful drafting of wills; we have no fear that our
decision today will prevent either the full utilization
of the marital deduction or the proper support of
widows during the pendency of an estate proceeding.
Jackson v. United States, supra at 510 (fn. refs. omitted). We
are not here concerned with the support of widows during the
pendency of an estate tax proceeding. In H. Rept. 97-201, supra
at 160, 1981-2 C.B. at 377-378, the Committee on Ways and Means
expressed the specific concern that, as between the decedent and
the spouse, the decedent be able to control the disposition of
qualified terminable interest property on the conclusion of the
spouse’s life estate. I do not believe that our decisions in
Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 327 (1991), Estate of
Robertson v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 678 (1992), and Estate of
Spencer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-579, are inconsistent
with Congress’ action to deal with that concern.
D. The Proposed Regulation
Section 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3), Estate Tax Regs., takes a
position consistent with the results we reached in the Estate of
Clayton, Estate of Robertson, and Estate of Spencer cases. In
that respect, section 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3), Estate Tax Regs., is
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