- 65 - interest in the property is contingent on the personal representative exercising the power in her favor. That is a clear violation of section 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II) (with an exception not here relevant, “no person has a power to appoint any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse.”). The statute is unambiguous. Indeed, section 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) specifically provides that the prohibition on powers is inapplicable to a power exercisable only at or after the death of the surviving spouse. By the terms of his will or by a power, a decedent can control the disposition of qualified terminable interest property upon the death of the surviving spouse. By requiring an election, section 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III) makes it clear that the executor of the estate or other personal representative of the decedent (hereafter, in either case, personal representative) can choose whether to take tax advantage of an otherwise qualifying bequest or devise of terminable interest property. The decedent cannot, however, empower his personal representative to deprive the spouse of what would be a qualified income interest for life by, for example, appointing the property to a trust in which she does not enjoy all of the income from the property for life. Simply, such a power is prohibited by section 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II). I do not consider section 2056(b)(7) to be ambiguous. Even if one were to consider the section ambiguous, however, so that a search for extrinsic evidence of congressional purpose werePage: Previous 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011