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effective with respect to decedents dying after March 1, 1994.
Sec. 20.2056(b)-10, Estate Tax Regs. The majority “[leaves] for
another day the issue of the validity of that regulation.”
Majority op. p. 16. What is one to make of that statement? Can
the majority possibly believe that section 2056(b)(7) is
ambiguous and that both the position we take today and the
position we took in the enumerated cases, and that the
Commissioner takes in section 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3), Estate Tax
Regs., are reasonable interpretations of the statute? Only if
the statute is ambiguous is the Commissioner then free to write a
regulation adopting any reasonable interpretation. NationsBank
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct.
810, 813-814 (1995); Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-844 (1984). No court,
neither this Court nor any of the Courts of Appeals that have
reversed us, has suggested any significant ambiguity in the
statute, much less an ambiguity broad enough to tolerate the
diametrically opposed readings found in our prior cases and in
the case we decide today. Certainly, decedents whose estate tax
cases might on appeal go to a Court of Appeals different than the
three that have reversed us bear the risk that such court might
find section 2056(b)(7) ambiguous. Also certainly, the Supreme
Court might find section 2056(b)(7) ambiguous (or unambiguous, as
interpreted by section 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3), Estate Tax Regs.).
Can we seriously say, however, that there is a substantial risk
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