- 34 -
evidence in the record. See Estate of Christ v. Commissioner,
480 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973), affg. 54 T.C. 493 (1970); IT&S
of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496, 508 (1991); Parker v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986). We have broad discretion
to evaluate the overall cogency of an expert's analysis. Sammons
v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ebben
v. Commissioner, 783 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)), affg. in
part and revg. in part on another issue T.C. Memo. 1986-318. We
are not bound by the formulae and opinions proffered by an
expert, especially when they are contrary to our own judgment.
Orth v. Commissioner, 813 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1987), affg.
Lio v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 56 (1985); Silverman v. Commis-
sioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-
285; Estate of Kreis v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 753, 755 (6th Cir.
1955), affg. T.C. Memo. 1954-139. Instead, we may reach a
decision based on our own analysis of all the evidence in the
record. Silverman v. Commissioner, supra at 933. The persua-
siveness of an expert's opinion depends largely upon the dis-
closed facts on which it is based. See Tripp v. Commissioner,
337 F.2d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1964), affg. T.C. Memo. 1963-244.
While we may accept the opinion of an expert in its entirety,
Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
441, 452 (1980), we may be selective in the use of any portion of
such an opinion. Parker v. Commissioner, supra at 562. We may
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