Robert D. Booth and Janice Booth, et al. - Page 67

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          unambiguous, when the text's plain meaning defeats the statute's            
          stated purpose.  As observed recently by the Court of Appeals for           
          the Ninth Circuit, the circuit in which an appeal of this case              
          lies:                                                                       
               We may not adopt a plain language interpretation of a                  
               statutory provision that directly undercuts the clear                  
               purpose of the statute.  In Brooks v. Donovan, 699 F.2d                
               1010 (9th Cir. 1983), we refused to adopt a plain                      
               language interpretation of a statute governing pension                 
               funds.  We reasoned that the "court must look beyond                   
               the express language of a statute where a literal                      
               interpretation 'would thwart the purpose of the overall                
               statutory scheme or lead to an absurd or futile                        
               result.'"  Brooks, 699 F.2d at 1011 (quoting                           
               International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec.                
               Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 917-918 (9th Cir. 1975)).  In                     
               reaching our conclusion, we followed the Supreme                       
               Court's approach in United States v. American Trucking                 
               Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed.                    
               1345 (1940).  There the Court noted that "[w]hen [a                    
               given] meaning has led to absurd results * * * this                    
               Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the                
               act.  Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning                 
               did not produce absurd results but merely an                           
               unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy                  
               of the legislation as a whole,' this Court has followed                
               that purpose, rather than the literal words."  American                
               Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. at 543. * * *                          
               [Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537, 545                   
               (9th Cir. 1994), affg. 95 T.C. 415 (1990).]                            
               Accordingly, in interpreting section 419A(f)(6), we look to            
          the statute as written by the legislators, and we consult the               
          statute's legislative history to learn its intended purpose and             
          to resolve ambiguity in the words used therein.  Landgraf v. USI            
          Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v.           
          GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).  Petitioners must             
          prove that the Prime Plan falls within the scope of section                 





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