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1, 31 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Campagnuolo, 556
F.2d 1209, 1214 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Levine,
690 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Congress intended
the subsequent application to "include a showing that the
original order was lawfully obtained, that it was sought
in good faith and not as subterfuge search, and that the
communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during
the course of a lawfully executed order." S. Rept. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2189.
We agree with respondent that 18 U.S.C. section 2515
of the Federal wiretap statute does not require suppression
of the wiretap evidence in these cases. First, we do not
agree that disclosure of the intercepted communications in
these cases would violate 18 U.S.C. section 2517(5).
Obviously, if there is no violation of 18 U.S.C. section
2517(5), then there is no predicate for petitioners'
argument that suppression of the wiretap evidence is
required by 18 U.S.C. section 2515. Title 18 U.S.C.
section 2517(5) applies only to "communications relating
to offenses other than those specified in the order of
authorization or approval". We interpret the term
"offenses", as used in 18 U.S.C. section 2517(5), in
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