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any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation
of Title III.
It is unnecessary in the instant cases for us to
follow the above cases and to decide that, as a matter of
law, the statutory suppression rule set forth in 18 U.S.C.
section 2515 is never applicable as a sanction for
violation of section 2517. To decide these cases, it is
only necessary to conclude, as we do, that the facts and
circumstances are such that suppression is not
an appropriate remedy. The same approach was taken in
Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1977).
See Spatafore v. United States, 752 F.2d 415, 417-418 (9th
Cir. 1985); Griffin v. United States, 588 F.2d 521, 524-526
(5th Cir. 1979); Estate of Best v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.
122, 141-142 (1981).
In these cases, like Fleming v. United States, supra,
the subject communications were lawfully intercepted during
a duly authorized wiretap, and the court orders authorizing
or approving the original interception and its extension
were sought in good faith and not as subterfuge. In fact,
Mr. London's jury conviction of conspiring to conduct and
actually conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a
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