Martin Ice Cream Company - Page 34

                                                - 34 -                                                  
            2.  MIC Is Not the Deemed Seller of Assets to H�agen-Dazs Under                             
                  Court Holding                                                                         
                  Respondent argues that Arnold began and completed the                                 
            negotiations with H�agen-Dazs for the sale of distribution rights                           
            on behalf of petitioner.  Respondent would have us believe that                             
            all essential terms fixed by the negotiations had been settled                              
            before Mr. Hewit informed H�agen-Dazs that SIC and Arnold would                             
            be the named sellers of the assets in the purchase agreement and                            
            instructed H�agen-Dazs to omit all references to Martin and                                 
            petitioner from the purchase agreements.  Respondent urges the                              
            Court to apply the principle of Commissioner v. Court Holding,                              
            Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945),16 to find that petitioner is the true                             
            seller of the assets, and that SIC is a mere conduit whose                                  

                  16 Shortly after issuance of Rev. Rul. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B.                             
            36, respondent first raised this theory with petitioner in a                                
            stipulation conference held on June 19, 1996, and was given leave                           
            to incorporate it in an amended answer filed less than 3 weeks                              
            before trial.  Generally, when the Commissioner makes allegations                           
            in an amended answer requiring the presentation of different                                
            evidence, then the Commissioner “has introduced a new matter” or                            
            a new issue that requires the shifting of the burden of proof to                            
            the Commissioner as to the new matter or issue.  Achiro v.                                  
            Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881, 890 (1981); see also Seagate Tech.                               
            Inc. & Consol. Subs. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149, 169 (1994).                             
                  Because the determination of the applicability of                                     
            Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), required                            
            respondent to present evidence of the events leading up to the                              
            sale of assets which is different from the evidence showing that                            
            the requirements of sec. 355 were not met, we issued an order                               
            shifting the burden of proof to respondent on the Court Holding                             
            issue.  However, we decide the issue on a preponderance of the                              
            evidence; therefore, the allocation of the burden of proof does                             
            not determine the outcome.  See Kean v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.                               
            575, 601 n.40 (1988) (citing Deskins v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.                               
            305, 323 n.17 (1986)).                                                                      




Page:  Previous  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011