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both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Sec.
1.170A-1(c)(2), Income Tax Regs.; see Jarre v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 183, 187 (1975).
Fair market value is a question of fact, and the trier of
fact must weigh all relevant evidence of value and draw
appropriate inferences. See Commissioner v. Scottish Am. Inv.
Co., 323 U.S. 119, 123-125 (1944); Helvering v. National Grocery
Co., 304 U.S. 282, 294 (1938); Symington v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
892, 896 (1986); Zmuda v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 714, 726 (1982),
affd. 731 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984). Fair market value is
measured on the applicable valuation date, which, in this case,
is the date of the alleged contribution. See sec. 170(a);
Estate of Proios v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-442; Thornton
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-479, affd. without published
opinion 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Estate of Aucker
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-185; Pabst Brewing Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-506. The willing buyer and the
willing seller are hypothetical persons, instead of specific
individuals or entities, and the characteristics of these
hypothetical persons are not always the same as the personal
characteristics of the actual seller or a particular buyer. See
Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1005-1006 (5th
Cir. 1981); Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 218
(1990). The views of both hypothetical persons are taken into
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