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position that is so supported will prevail. See Estate of
Scanlan v. Commissioner, supra.
We decline to rely on Wieme's testimony as to the "value in
use". As a threshold matter, the conclusion derived by an
expert's analysis must be reached by application of the correct
standard before we will rely on that conclusion. That was not
done in this case. The applicable regulations mandate the use of
a "fair market value" standard as defined therein. See sec.
1.170A-1(c)(1) and (2), Income Tax Regs. That standard
contemplates a hypothetical seller and buyer and precludes
consideration of the specific characteristics of any particular
seller or buyer. The $12.2 million figure upon which Arbor
relies was derived not by employing the applicable standard but
by employing an improper standard which took into account the
specific buyer, U of M, and its characteristics. Even if we were
to agree with Wieme that the "value in use" to U of M was $12.2
million, and we stop short of so doing, this would not aid Arbor
in its quest for a charitable contribution deduction since that
figure does not represent the "fair market value" of Wolverine
Tower on the valuation date within the meaning of the
regulations.
The standard employed by Wieme to derive the $9 million
"market value" figure resembles much more closely the "fair
market value" standard applicable in this case. Were we to rely
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