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Actual Knowledge
Petitioner asserts that we should consider whether for
purposes of section 6015(c), she had actual knowledge of the
Hitech checks at the time she signed the 1984 and 1985 returns.
Petitioner points out that the standard of "actual knowledge"
under section 6015(c)(3)(C) is a narrower standard than that of
"known or should have known" under section 6013(e). The
conference committee report states that "actual knowledge must be
established by the evidence and shall not be inferred based on
indications that the electing spouse had a reason to know." H.
Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 253 (1998). Furthermore, section
6015(c)(3)(C) places the burden to establish actual knowledge on
respondent.
Petitioner acknowledges that we found that she "was,
however, precisely aware of the amounts derived from Hitech via
David that actually passed through her hands." Wiksell v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-3. However, petitioner argues that
we relied upon the same factors to find that petitioner had
"reason to know" of the Hitech checks in Wiksell v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1994-99, as we did to conclude that petitioner was
"precisely aware" of the Hitech checks in Wiksell v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-3. Therefore, petitioner
concludes, "precisely aware" must mean something other than
actual knowledge as contemplated by Congress, and reconsideration
is appropriate.
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