- 10 -
petitioner's reasoning, since we have already concluded that
these facts are indications of "reason to know", they cannot form
the basis for "actual knowledge" under section 6015(c). This
argument facilely ignores the obvious fact that the "actual
knowledge" concept subsumes the concept of "reason to know";
i.e., if a person has actual knowledge of a fact, she also has
reason to know of it (the converse, of course, not necessarily
being true).
Petitioner's argument is illogical, and we find it
unpersuasive. Our opinion in Wiksell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-3, does not indicate that we inferred petitioner's actual
knowledge "based on indications that the electing spouse had a
reason to know." H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, supra at 253. We think
in this particular case that the same facts used to determine
that petitioner "had reason to know" also amply establish that
petitioner had "actual knowledge" or a "precise awareness".
Petitioner further argues that section 6015(c) has changed
the culpability standard from objective under section 6013(e) to
subjective. Under section 6013(e)(1)(C), a taxpayer spouse must
establish "that in signing the return he or she did not know, and
had no reason to know, that there was * * * [a] substantial
understatement". Petitioner points out that findings of
objectivity dominate the record. As such, petitioner concludes,
our findings and holdings are consistent with the objective
standard, and accordingly, reconsideration is warranted.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011