David L. Wiksell and Margaret Ann Carpender - Page 9




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               In Wiksell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-99, we stated              
          that                                                                        
               We do not believe it necessary to repeat all of our                    
               findings of fact to demonstrate our reasons for concluding             
               that * * * [petitioner] not only had reason to know, but               
               actually had knowledge, that the returns contained                     
               substantial understatements.  * * * [Petitioner's] actual              
               knowledge is established by the simple fact that * * *                 
               [petitioner] admitted that she asked David why there was no            
               income on the returns reflecting the money that had been               
               coming to her through him from Hitech, and which the family            
               had been living on during the years in issue.  * * *                   
          We subsequently stated:                                                     
               [Petitioner] also had reason to know of the                            
               substantial understatements.  She was well aware of David's            
               involvement in Hitech, and during 1984 she received 23                 
               Hitech checks from David totaling $54,500, which she                   
               deposited into her separate checking accounts.  During 1985,           
               she received 15 Hitech checks from David totaling $140,500             
               which she deposited into her separate checking accounts.               
               Throughout these years * * * [petitioner] wrote large checks           
               on her individual account to charities, political                      
               candidates, and for home improvements.  She had to know that           
               her own meager earnings from nursing were vastly                       
               insufficient to provide these funds.  [Id.]                            
               In Wiksell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-3, we stated:              
                    Petitioner was, however, precisely aware of the amounts           
               derived from Hitech via David that actually passed through             
               her hands.  As we have found, in 1984, petitioner was given            
               23 checks from Hitech, totaling $54,500.  In 1985,                     
               petitioner received 15 Hitech checks totaling $140,500.                
               During these same years petitioner spent substantial amounts           
               for clothing for herself and her children, loans to a child,           
               charitable and political contributions, entertainment and              
               gifts, home furnishings, home repair and maintenance, credit           
               card payments, mortgage payments, and numerous other                   
               miscellaneous expenses.                                                
               In essence, petitioner argues that because we used similar             
          facts to derive two different conclusions (i.e., "had reason to             
          know" versus "precisely aware"), it follows that these facts                
          could not have justified both conclusions.  According to                    

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