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We dismiss petitioner's argument because it ignores the
language of our finding that petitioner was "precisely aware" of
the Hitech checks she received from David. Our finding was based
on petitioner's subjective awareness of the Hitech check deposits
and her subjective awareness that she wrote checks in amounts far
in excess of the modest income she earned as a part-time nurse in
1984 and 1985.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that our opinion in Wiksell
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-3, has adequately addressed
whether petitioner had actual knowledge with respect to the
Hitech checks she received from David.
Duress
Petitioner argues that neither the Tax Court nor the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could possibly have
considered the significance of the term "duress" as contemplated
by legislative mandate, as that concept had just been newly
codified in section 6015. Section 6015(c)(3)(C) provides in
pertinent part: "This subparagraph shall not apply where the
individual with actual knowledge establishes that such individual
signed the return under duress."
Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicate
that Congress intended to define the term "duress". See sec.
6015(c)(3)(C); H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, supra at 251-255. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit directly addressed
the question of whether petitioner signed the returns in question
under duress and concluded that she did not. Wiksell v.
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