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tion is in satisfaction of the buyer’s obligation to surrender
for redemption stock that, actually, in Wall, or constructively,
in Sullivan, he had purchased from the seller. Any transfer by
the seller directly to the corporation would, under that logic,
be on behalf of the buyer. Contrariwise, if the remaining
shareholder has not purchased the seller’s stock, and has no
obligation to do so, as in Edenfield v. Commissioner, supra, the
transfer to the corporation should not be viewed as on the
remaining shareholder’s behalf. Since there is no practical
difference between the Wall and Edenfield type formats, the
choice of form by the parties to the transaction plays a dominant
role in determining the income tax consequences that will follow,
and the crucial distinction is whether the corporation satisfies
a legal obligation of the remaining shareholder to purchase the
redeemed stock. No matter how close a taxpayer comes to under-
taking a legal obligation to purchase the redeemed stock, the
Wall principle should not apply unless that obligation was in
fact undertaken. Thus, in S.K. Ames, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46
B.T.A. 1020 (1942), we construed a contract to purchase stock
that provided that the taxpayer would “purchase or cause to be
purchased” the stock. We held that the promise to “purchase or
cause to be purchased” provided several methods for satisfying
the obligation created under the contract, and, therefore, the
taxpayer incurred no absolute obligation to purchase the stock.
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