Estate of Albert Strangi - Page 38




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          property he transferred,2 section 2512(b) should be applied.                
          Pursuant to that section the excess of the value of the property            
          decedent transferred to the partnership over the value of the               
          consideration he received is “deemed a gift” subject to the gift            
          tax.  By failing to apply section 2512(b) in this case, the                 
          majority thwarts the purpose of section 2512(b) which the Supreme           
          Court described as “the evident desire of Congress to hit all the           
          protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not           
          business transactions”.  Commissioner v. Wemyss, supra at 306.              
               PARR, BEGHE, GALE, and MARVEL, JJ., agree with this                    
          dissenting opinion.                                                         






               2The majority’s allowance of a 31-percent discount is in               
          stark contrast to its rejection of respondent’s gift argument on            
          the ground that decedent did not give up control of the assets              
          when he transferred them to the partnership.  See majority op. p.           
          21.  While the basis for finding that decedent did not give up              
          control of the assets is not fully explained, it appears not to             
          be based on the literal terms of the partnership agreement which            
          gave control to Stranco, the corporate general partner.  Decedent           
          owned only 47 percent of the Stranco stock.  Since the majority             
          also rejects respondent’s economic substance argument, the only             
          other conceivable basis for concluding that decedent retained               
          control over the assets that he contributed to the partnership is           
          that the partnership arrangement was a factual sham.  If that               
          were the case, the partnership arrangement itself would be “mere            
          window dressing” masking the true facts and the terms of the                
          partnership arrangement should be disregarded.  In an analogous             
          situation the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disregarded            
          the written terms of a transfer document as fraudulent.  See                
          Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991).                      







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