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BEGHE, J., dissenting: Having joined the dissents of Judges
Parr and Ruwe, I write separately to describe another path to the
conclusion that SFLP had no effect on the value of Mr. Strangi’s
gross estate under sections 2031 and 2033. In my view, the
property to be valued is the property originally held by Mr.
Strangi, the so-called contributed property. Notwithstanding
that the property in question may have been contributed to a
partnership formed on Mr. Strangi’s behalf in exchange for a 99-
percent limited partnership interest, we’re not bound to accept
the estate’s contention that the property to be valued is its
interest in SFLP, subject to all the disabilities and resulting
valuation discounts entailed by ownership of an interest in a
limited partnership. Instead, the facts of this case invite us
to use the end-result version of the step-transaction doctrine to
treat the underlying partnership assets--the property originally
held by the decedent--as the property to be valued for estate tax
purposes.
The value of property for transfer tax purposes is the price
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts. See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550-551
(1973); sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs.; sec. 25.2512-1, Gift
Tax Regs. The majority state that SFLP’s existence “would not be
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