Estate of Albert Strangi - Page 40




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          disregarded by potential purchasers of decedent’s assets”; the              
          majority also suggest that this is why the partnership should not           
          be disregarded as a substantive sham.  See majority op. p. 16.              
               I support the use of substance over form analysis to decide            
          whether a transaction qualifies for the tax-law defined status              
          its form suggests.  A formally correct transaction without a                
          business purpose may not be a “reorganization”, and a title                 
          holder of property without an economic interest may not be the              
          tax “owner”.  However, I share the majority’s concerns about                
          using substance over form analysis to alter the conclusion about            
          a real-world fact, such as the fair market value of property,               
          which the law tells us is the price at which the property                   
          actually could be sold.1                                                    


               1 Against the grain of the majority’s conclusions that the             
          SFLP arrangements were neither a factual sham nor a substantive             
          sham, I would observe that another “conceivable basis for                   
          concluding that decedent retained control over the assets that he           
          contributed to the partnership” (Ruwe, J., dissenting opinion               
          page 38 note 2) are the multiple roles played by Mr. Gulig, who             
          had decedent’s power of attorney and caused himself to be                   
          employed by Stranco to manage the affairs of SFLP, and the tacit            
          understanding of the other family members that he would look out            
          for their interests.  Although I would agree with the majority              
          that use of substantive sham analysis may not be appropriate in             
          transfer tax cases, I believe that factual sham analysis can be             
          used in appropriate cases in the transfer tax area and that the             
          case at hand is one of those cases; the terms of the SFLP                   
          partnership agreement should be disregarded because the parties             
          to the agreement didn’t pay any attention to them.  Cf. Heyen v.            
          United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991).  To adapt to the              
          case at hand the hypothetical posed by the Court of Appeals in              
          Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1254-             
                                                             (continued...)           






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