Gwendolyn A. Ewing - Page 44




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          modified innocent spouse relief, the separate liability election,           
          and equitable relief.                                                       
               The majority opinion rests primarily on the fact that the              
          Court has held previously in Fernandez v. Commissioner, supra,              
          and Butler v. Commissioner, supra, that the Court has                       
          jurisdiction to decide a claim for relief under section 6015(f).            
          As I read the majority’s opinion, those decisions compel the                
          conclusion that we have jurisdiction in this case.  I disagree.             
          The cases of Fernandez v. Commissioner, supra, and Butler v.                
          Commissioner, supra, are factually distinguishable from the                 
          setting at hand.8  Although it is true that both of those cases             


               7(...continued)                                                        
          text of the statute as a whole and the statutory scheme crafted             
          by Congress for relief from joint liability.  See FDA v. Brown &            
          Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-133 (2000).  I                  
          conclude that the phrase does not empower the Court to consider             
          granting to any individual any form of relief available under               
          sec. 6015 simply because the individual petitions the Court for             
          relief from joint liability.  Instead, in a stand alone                     
          proceeding such as this, Congress has allowed the Court to                  
          provide relief under sec. 6015 only to an individual described in           
          sec. 6015(e)(1).  I construe Congress’s use of the term “the                
          individual” in sec. 6015(e)(1)(A) to refer only to those                    
          individuals described in sec. 6015(e)(1); i.e., “an individual              
          against [1] whom a deficiency has been asserted and [2] who                 
          elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply”.                                
               8 I also note that the version of sec. 6015(e)(1) that the             
          Court applied in Fernandez v. Commissioner, supra, and Butler v.            
          Commissioner, supra, has since been amended by inserting after              
          “individual”, the words “against whom a deficiency has been                 
          asserted and”.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (CAA),                
          Pub. L. 106-554, app. G, sec. 313(a)(3)(A), 114 Stat. 2763A-641             
          (2000).  That amendment is applicable to this case in that it               
          “shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act”                
                                                             (continued...)           





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