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FOLEY, J., dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s
analysis and holding.
A. The Statute’s Plain Language Dictates
Congress, through its grant of legislative regulatory
authority, mandated that “the determination as to whether income
is [sourced, or effectively connected to a taxpayer’s trade or
business, in American Samoa] shall be made under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.” Sec. 931(d)(2). Pursuant to the
plain and unambiguous language of section 931(d)(2), there can be
no such determination until regulations are issued. Where the
statute’s language is plain, the language is where the
interpretive task should end, and the sole function of the courts
is to enforce such language according to its terms. United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989);
United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 187-188 (1923)(stating
that tax statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond
the clear import of the language used).
Section 931 cannot be reasonably interpreted because
definition of the statute’s most integral terms is relegated to
regulations that do not exist. Congress explicitly vested the
Secretary with the authority to prescribe legislative regulations
delineating the scope of the income exclusion pursuant to section
931(d)(2). See Coca-Cola Co. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 1, 19
(1996); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
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