Robert S. Cohen and Margery Cohen - Page 21

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               A taxpayer may avoid liability for negligence under section            
          6653(a)(1) and (2) if he or she reasonably relied on competent              
          professional advice.  United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250-            
          251 (1985); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987),               
          affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).             
          Reliance on professional advice, standing alone, is not an                  
          absolute defense to negligence, but rather a factor to be                   
          considered.  Freytag v. Commissioner, supra.  For reliance on               
          professional advice to excuse a taxpayer from the negligence                
          additions to tax, the taxpayer must show that the professional              
          had the expertise and knowledge of the pertinent facts to provide           
          informed advice on the subject matter.  David v. Commissioner, 43           
          F.3d 788, 789-790 (2d Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-621;                
          Goldman v. Commissioner, supra at 408; see Freytag v.                       
          Commissioner, supra; Sann v. Commissioner, supra.                           
               Reliance on representations by insiders, promoters, or                 
          offering materials has been held an inadequate defense to                   
          negligence.  Goldman v. Commissioner, supra; Sann v.                        
          Commissioner, supra; see Berry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-            
          311; Carroll v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-184.  Pleas of                
          reliance have been rejected when neither the taxpayer nor the               


               9(...continued)                                                        
          commencing after July 22, 1998.  Petitioners do not contend, nor            
          is there evidence, that their examination commenced after July              
          22, 1998, or that sec. 7491(c) is applicable in this case.                  





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