Michael T. Hawkins and Janine M. Hansen - Page 6

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          that application of the burden is the least restrictive means of            
          achieving a compelling governmental interest.3  See 42 U.S.C.               
          sec. 2000bb-1(b); Adams v. Commissioner, supra.  In evaluating              
          whether the Government has met the compelling interest test,                
          cases decided prior to Smith are applicable, and the test “should           
          not be construed more stringently or more leniently than it was             
          prior to Smith.”  Adams v. Commissioner, supra at 139.                      
          1.  Substantial Burden                                                      
               To establish a violation under RFRA, a claimant must first             
          show that the Government “substantially burdened” his or her free           
          exercise of religion.  42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(a).  A statute               
          burdens the free exercise of religion if it “puts substantial               
          pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his           
          beliefs”.  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450           
          U.S. 707, 718 (1981).  A substantial burden must be more than an            


          3  In addition to the compelling interest test provided for by              
          RFRA, petitioners rely on Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207               
          (9th Cir. 1999), to assert a hybrid-rights claim and apply a                
          strict scrutiny analysis.  In Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.            
          872, 881-882, (1990), the Supreme Court excepted a hybrid-rights            
          claim from its rational basis analysis and thus recognized the              
          applicability of the strict scrutiny analysis where a law                   
          “[involves] not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free                
          Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional                    
          protections”.  Petitioners’ argument for strict scrutiny analysis           
          here amounts to a request for application of the compelling                 
          interest test set forth by RFRA.  See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado,              
          530 U.S. 703, 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(2000), (referring to             
          “that stringent mode of constitutional analysis our cases refer             
          to as ‘strict scrutiny,’ which requires that the restriction be             
          narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); see              
          also Kessler v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1285, 1290 (1986), affd.              
          838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988).                                              




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