Michael T. Hawkins and Janine M. Hansen - Page 17

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          petitioners’ religious beliefs are substantially burdened, the              
          Federal income tax system does not violate RFRA.8                           
          C.  Remaining Contentions in Response to Summary Judgment Motion            
               The remaining contentions raised by petitioners in the                 
          response to summary judgment motion are shopworn and frivolous              
          assertions that do not deserve careful analysis.  See Crain v.              
          Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).                                
               First, as previously discussed, petitioners’ contention that           
          RFRA provides for this matter to be heard by an Article III                 
          court, and their argument about their right to a jury trial with            
          respect to this case are without merit.  See supra pp. 10-12.               
               Second, petitioners have not been denied due process.  The             
          provision of an administrative hearing before the Appeals                   
          division is not essential to the validity of a notice of                    
          deficiency and would have been futile since petitioners did not             
          dispute the computation or amount of the tax.  See Cataldo v.               
          Commissioner, 60 T.C. 522, 523 (1973), affd. per curiam 499 F.2d            
          550 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Corcoran v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.           

          8  Petitioners contend that the least restrictive means of                  
          furthering the Government’s compelling interest is to simply                
          “waive” the determined deficiencies in, and additions to, tax.              
          In support of their argument, petitioners rely on the                       
          unsubstantiated argument that during the previous years 1991,               
          1993, 1994, and 1995, respondent allegedly did not pursue any               
          adjustments.  Petitioners’ argument, however, must fail because             
          it is well settled that each taxable year stands on its own and             
          must be separately considered.  Respondent is not bound in any              
          given year to allow the same treatment permitted in a previous              
          year.  Pekar v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 158, 166 (1999).  The                
          circumstances of prior years are not relevant, and we consider              
          only the taxable years at issue before this Court.                          





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