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The plain meaning of statutory language ordinarily is
conclusive. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 241-242 (1989); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner,
supra. If the language of a statute is clear, we look no further
than that language in determining the meaning of the statute.
See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990); United States
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., supra at 241. A court looks to
legislative history only if the statute is unclear. Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); United States v. Lewis, 67
F.3d 225, 228-229 (9th Cir. 1995).
The plain language of the statute, both pre- and post-
amendment by the SBJPA, refers to the amount of damages
“received”, not the amount “realized”. Sec. 104(a)(2); see also
SBJPA sec. 1605(d)(1) (“the amendments made by this section shall
apply to amounts received after the date of the enactment of this
Act, in taxable years ending after such date” (emphasis added)).
Petitioner’s “realization” argument ignores the plain language of
the statute. Petitioner did not receive the three payments
before August 20, 1996.
Additionally, amounts are included in gross income for the
taxable year in which they are received by the taxpayer. Sec.
451(a); Knoll v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-277 (applying this
principle in the context of a section 104 case). Petitioner
received the May 1997 payment and the November 1998 payment in
1997 and 1998 (and the November 1996 payment after August 20,
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