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The imposition of a wholly new tax is to be distinguished
from changes in the rate of an existing tax. United States v.
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 298-300 (1981); Quarty v. United States,
supra at 966-967; Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.2d 638,
642-643 (8th Cir. 1992); Estate of Ekins v. Commissioner, 797
F.2d 481, 484-485 (7th Cir. 1986); Fein v. United States, 730
F.2d 1211, 1212-1214 (8th Cir. 1984); Estate of Ceppi v.
Commissioner, 698 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1983), modifying 78
T.C. 320 (1982). Furthermore, amendments which eliminate an
exemption, exclusion, or tax credit have repeatedly been
construed as “‘closer in kind and in effect to a mere increase in
the tax rate than to the enactment of a wholly new tax.’”
Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, supra at 642-643 (quoting Fein
v. United States, supra at 1213); see also Estate of Ekins v.
Commissioner, supra at 484-485; Estate of Ceppi v. Commissioner,
supra at 17, 21.
Turning to the case at bar, the SBJPA amendments to section
104 restricted the availability of an exclusion from gross
income. In that instance, retroactivity would not be
constitutionally objectionable on grounds related to a wholly new
tax. Accordingly, petitioner’s situation does not present reason
for departure from the standards typically employed to evaluate
tax legislation.
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