Gavin Polone - Page 55

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          provision explicitly dictates the particular conduct and the                
          timing thereof to which the amendments “shall apply”.  According            
          to the express text, receipt of payments after the August 20,               
          1996, date of enactment falls within the intended scope of the              
          post-SBJPA section 104, unless the explicit exception for a prior           
          binding agreement, court decree, or mediation award is                      
          applicable.                                                                 
               Here, a final, written, and binding settlement agreement was           
          not entered into until 1996.  Petitioner’s situation therefore              
          fails to satisfy the requisites for relief under SBJPA section              
          1605(d)(2).  In that event, SBJPA section 1605(d)(1) explicitly             
          and unambiguously prescribes the temporal reach of the section              
          104 amendments to the situation at hand.  We conclude that                  
          Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., supra, would pose no barrier here to           
          application of post-SBJPA section 104.                                      
               Moreover, less than 2 months after issuing its decision in             
          Landgraf, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Carlton, 512           
          U.S. 26 (1994).  The issue in United States v. Carlton, supra at            
          27, was the propriety of retroactive application of an amendment            
          to a Federal estate tax statute.  In that context, the Supreme              
          Court explained as follows:                                                 
                    This Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax                  
               legislation against a due process challenge.  Some of                  
               its decisions have stated that the validity of a                       
               retroactive tax provision under the Due Process Clause                 
               depends upon whether retroactive application is so                     
               harsh and oppressive as to transgress the                              
               constitutional limitation.  The harsh and oppressive                   





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