- 59 -
Cir. 1985) (upholding at least a 4-year retroactive application);
Rocanova v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(upholding retroactive application of amendment extending statute
of limitation on tax collection actions from 6 to 10 years),
affd. 109 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1997). “The Supreme Court has never
explicitly imposed a time limit on the retroactivity of a tax
statute’s application.” Wiggins v. Commissioner, supra at 316.
To the extent petitioner raises issues of retroactivity,
application of the SBJPA amendments to section 104 would not
violate the standards requiring a rational purpose and reasonable
period. The tests employed to evaluate retroactive legislation
therefore do not justify refusal to apply the law in effect for
the tax years under consideration. We conclude that post-SBJPA
section 104 is neither retroactive nor unconstitutional.30 See
Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2003); Venable v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-240.
E. Conclusion
Petitioner’s arguments for the application of pre-SBJPA
section 104 to the three payments fails. There is no evidence of
how much, if anything, petitioner spent for medical care for
emotional distress. Therefore, petitioner failed to meet his
30 We note that petitioner also argues that he could have
avoided the application of post-SBJPA sec. 104 by receiving an
up-front payment. We disagree. UTA would not, and did not,
agree to an up-front, lump-sum payment.
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