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phrase indicates that the payments were intended to support Ms.
Springer, as contrasted with the payments provided by article 16
to support her estate or to equalize the property distribution
between her and petitioner. Interpreting the divorce documents
to mean that the annual payments would not have terminated on the
death of Ms. Springer would lead to the result that if she had
died, then petitioner (or his estate) would have had to make
payments for Ms. Springer’s “support and maintenance” after her
death. It is illogical and contrary to the accepted use of these
terms in such documents for “support” and “maintenance” to be
required by a decedent.13 Furthermore, acceptance of
respondent’s position would effectively rewrite the second
paragraph to state that the annual payments would not terminate
on the death of petitioner or Ms. Springer, or on the remarriage
of Ms. Springer.
Contrary to respondent’s contentions, our analysis of the
issue presented does not result in “lumping the payments”
together or making a “consolidated classification” in violation
of the general rule prohibiting the merger of different types of
payments into a single stream of payments. Rather, our
interpretation is consistent with well-established principles of
13This case is distinguishable from Cunningham v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474, because the term of the annual
payments in this case is consistent with a period to support the
postdivorce transition of the payee spouse.
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