Marlin G. Springer - Page 19

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          phrase indicates that the payments were intended to support Ms.             
          Springer, as contrasted with the payments provided by article 16            
          to support her estate or to equalize the property distribution              
          between her and petitioner.  Interpreting the divorce documents             
          to mean that the annual payments would not have terminated on the           
          death of Ms. Springer would lead to the result that if she had              
          died, then petitioner (or his estate) would have had to make                
          payments for Ms. Springer’s “support and maintenance” after her             
          death.  It is illogical and contrary to the accepted use of these           
          terms in such documents for “support” and “maintenance” to be               
          required by a decedent.13  Furthermore, acceptance of                       
          respondent’s position would effectively rewrite the second                  
          paragraph to state that the annual payments would not terminate             
          on the death of petitioner or Ms. Springer, or on the remarriage            
          of Ms. Springer.                                                            
               Contrary to respondent’s contentions, our analysis of the              
          issue presented does not result in “lumping the payments”                   
          together or making a “consolidated classification” in violation             
          of the general rule prohibiting the merger of different types of            
          payments into a single stream of payments.  Rather, our                     
          interpretation is consistent with well-established principles of            

               13This case is distinguishable from Cunningham v.                      
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474, because the term of the annual           
          payments in this case is consistent with a period to support the            
          postdivorce transition of the payee spouse.                                 

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