- 19 - phrase indicates that the payments were intended to support Ms. Springer, as contrasted with the payments provided by article 16 to support her estate or to equalize the property distribution between her and petitioner. Interpreting the divorce documents to mean that the annual payments would not have terminated on the death of Ms. Springer would lead to the result that if she had died, then petitioner (or his estate) would have had to make payments for Ms. Springer’s “support and maintenance” after her death. It is illogical and contrary to the accepted use of these terms in such documents for “support” and “maintenance” to be required by a decedent.13 Furthermore, acceptance of respondent’s position would effectively rewrite the second paragraph to state that the annual payments would not terminate on the death of petitioner or Ms. Springer, or on the remarriage of Ms. Springer. Contrary to respondent’s contentions, our analysis of the issue presented does not result in “lumping the payments” together or making a “consolidated classification” in violation of the general rule prohibiting the merger of different types of payments into a single stream of payments. Rather, our interpretation is consistent with well-established principles of 13This case is distinguishable from Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474, because the term of the annual payments in this case is consistent with a period to support the postdivorce transition of the payee spouse.Page: Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Next
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