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of liability for the remaining payments to her. Id. at 441-442.
The court noted:
The words “terminate upon the death of either party or
the remarriage of the recipient,” clearly show that
this portion of the statute needs no order of court to
effect termination. The alimony terminates by
operation of law when the condition occurs. * * * [Id.
at 443.]
Thus, the court recognized that if Neb. Rev. Stat. section 42-365
applies, liability to make payments terminates without a court
order or modification of the divorce document. The court
ultimately held that the order of the court that the alimony be
“paid in full” did not evidence an intention that the alimony
order should not terminate on remarriage. Id. at 444.
In Pettid v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-126, we applied
Neb. Rev. Stat. section 42-365 in a situation where the divorce
instruments were silent regarding whether payments would
terminate on the death of either party or the remarriage of the
payee spouse. We distinguished the situation in Watters v.
Foreman, supra, on the ground that the divorce decree in that
case “expressly dealt with termination and provided that
termination would occur upon the death of the payee spouse.”
Because the divorce instrument in Pettid was silent about
termination and the effect that the death of either party or the
remarriage of the payee spouse would have on the payor’s
liability to make the payments, we held that the parties had not
“otherwise agreed” in writing regarding the effect of the death
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