Marlin G. Springer - Page 22

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          liability to make the monthly alimony payments.  The court                  
          initially noted that the value of the marital estate appeared to            
          be in excess of $200,000, but that the wife was receiving only              
          the monthly payments totaling $18,500, a 1973 Cadillac, some                
          household goods, and payment of $5,000 of her attorney’s fees.              
          Id.  The court then examined the language of the divorce decree             
          and held:                                                                   
               Where the parties by their agreement in writing, or the                
               court by its decree, provide that a specific amount of                 
               alimony shall be paid for a specific period of time,                   
               and shall terminate only upon the occurring of a                       
               specific event set out in the agreement or decree and                  
               otherwise shall not be subject to amendment or                         
               revision, the payment of such alimony shall terminate                  
               only upon the happening of the event set out in the                    
               agreement or decree. * * * [Id. at 854.]                               
          Thus, the fact that the husband and wife provided for a                     
          termination event and the agreement was not modifiable resulted             
          in the nonapplicability of Neb. Rev. Stat. section 42-365.                  
               Later, in Kingery v. Kingery, 320 N.W.2d 441 (Neb. 1982),              
          the issue was whether a nonmodifiable provision requiring that              
          payments be made until “paid in full” precluded application of              
          Neb. Rev. Stat. section 42-365 because the parties had “otherwise           
          agreed” within the meaning of the statute.  The decree of                   
          dissolution was silent regarding the effect of death or                     
          remarriage, and the husband argued that on his ex-wife’s                    
          remarriage Neb. Rev. Stat. section 42-365 operated to relieve him           

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