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or remarriage of the payee spouse on the payor spouse’s liability
to make the payments.
Additionally, we addressed the Commissioner’s argument that
a provision in the instrument stating that the agreement was
binding on the parties and their heirs, assigns, and personal
representatives indicated that the payor spouse or his estate
might be liable to make payments to the payee spouse after her
death. We declined to read the binding agreement provision so
broadly “as to require the payments to continue after * * * [the
payee spouse’s] death or to constitute an agreement of the
parties that the alimony order will not terminate on * * * [the
payee spouse’s] death, as otherwise required by Neb. Rev. Stat.
section 42-365.”15
Finally, we examined the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s holding
in Kingery v. Kingery, supra. We noted that under the holding of
that case, if Neb. Rev. Stat. section 42-365 applies, a payor’s
liability to pay alimony terminates automatically on the death of
the payee. Like the court in that case, we disagreed with the
position that the statutory direction can be defeated by a
general contractual provision prohibiting modification of the
agreement.
15The marital agreement in this case contains a similar
“binding agreement” provision. Respondent has not argued in this
case that this provision indicates or implies that the annual
payments were intended to survive the death of Ms. Springer.
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