Sandra G. Venable - Page 14

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          application of an amendment made to a Federal estate tax statute.           
          In that context, the Supreme Court explained as follows:                    
                    This Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax                  
               legislation against a due process challenge.  Some of                  
               its decisions have stated that the validity of a                       
               retroactive tax provision under the Due Process Clause                 
               depends upon whether retroactive application is so                     
               harsh and oppressive as to transgress the                              
               constitutional limitation.  The harsh and oppressive                   
               formulation, however, does not differ from the                         
               prohibition against arbitrary and irrational                           
               legislation that applies generally to enactments in the                
               sphere of economic policy.  The due process standard to                
               be applied to tax statutes with retroactive effect,                    
               therefore, is the same as that generally applicable to                 
               retroactive economic legislation: * * * that burden is                 
               met simply by showing that the retroactive application                 
               of the legislation is itself justified by a rational                   
               legislative purpose.  [Id. at 30-31; internal                          
               quotations and citations omitted.]                                     
          The Supreme Court further noted:                                            
               “Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer                 
               nor a liability which he assumes by contract.  It is                   
               but a way of apportioning the cost of government among                 
               those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its                  
               benefits and must bear its burdens.  Since no citizen                  
               enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive                      
               imposition does not necessarily infringe due process *                 
               * * ”  [Id. at 33 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S.                    
               134, 146-147 (1938)).]                                                 
               In general, the raising of Government revenue is considered            
          a sufficient and legitimate legislative purpose for supporting a            
          “modest” period of retroactivity.  Id. at 32-33; id. at 37                  
          (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); NationsBank v. United               
          States, 269 F.3d 1332, 1337-1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Quarty v.                
          United States, 170 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 1999); Furlong v.                
          Commissioner, 36 F.3d 25, 27-28 (7th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo.           





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