- 15 -
1993-191. The principal exception to this reasoning discernible
from caselaw arises in scenarios involving imposition of a
“wholly new tax”. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34;
Quarty v. United States, supra at 966-967; Furlong v.
Commissioner, supra at 27; Wiggins v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 311,
314 (5th Cir. 1990), affg. 92 T.C. 869 (1989).
The imposition of a wholly new tax is to be distinguished
from changes in the rate of an existing tax. United States v.
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 298-300 (1981); Quarty v. United States,
supra at 966-967; Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.2d 638,
642-643 (8th Cir. 1992); Estate of Ekins v. Commissioner, 797
F.2d 481, 484-485 (7th Cir. 1986); Fein v. United States, 730
F.2d 1211, 1212-1214 (8th Cir. 1984); Estate of Ceppi v.
Commissioner, 698 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1983), affg. 78 T.C.
320 (1982). Furthermore, amendments which eliminate an
exemption, exclusion, or tax credit have repeatedly been
construed as “‘closer in kind and in effect to a mere increase in
the tax rate than to the enactment of a wholly new tax.’”
Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, supra at 642-643 (quoting Fein
v. United States, supra at 1213); see also Estate of Ekins v.
Commissioner, supra at 484-485; Estate of Ceppi v. Commissioner,
supra at 17, 21.
Turning to the case at bar, the amendment to section 104
restricted the availability of an exclusion from gross income.
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