Sandra G. Venable - Page 16

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          In such instance, retroactivity would not be constitutionally               
          objectionable on grounds related to a wholly new tax.                       
          Accordingly, petitioner’s situation does not present reason for             
          departure from the lenient standards typically employed to                  
          evaluate tax legislation.                                                   
               As regards legitimate governmental purpose, the legislative            
          history accompanying the SBJPA notes that “Courts have                      
          interpreted the exclusion from gross income of damages received             
          on account of personal injury or sickness broadly in some cases             
          to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a                 
          physical injury or sickness.”  H. Conf. Rept. 104-737, supra at             
          300, 1996-3 C.B. at 1040.  Congress’s choice to narrow the                  
          exclusion, and any retroactive application of the change, would             
          therefore appear to be rationally linked to the legitimate                  
          objective of raising revenue.  Legislative history further                  
          reveals that the change was intended as a curative measure                  
          designed to reduce or eliminate ambiguity in the otherwise                  
          applicable law.  Reference is made to “confusion” that “led to              
          substantial litigation”, including the Supreme Court cases of               
          Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995), and United States            
          v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).  H. Rept. 104-586, at 143 (1996),            
          1996-3 C.B. 331, 481.                                                       
               In addition, the period of “retroactivity” alleged by                  
          petitioner in this case, i.e., slightly less than 2 years, does             






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