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not exceed what has been upheld in other tax litigation. See,
e.g., Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding application of tax penalty passed in 1986 to returns
previously filed for years 1982 through 1984), affg. T.C. Memo.
1990-4; Canisius Coll. v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 26-27 (2d
Cir. 1986) (upholding 4-year retroactive application); Temple
Univ. v. United States, 769 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding at
least a 4-year retroactive application); Rocanova v. United
States, 955 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding retroactive
application of amendment extending statute of limitation on tax
collection actions from 6 to 10 years), affd. 109 F.3d 127 (2d
Cir. 1997). As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
observed: “The Supreme Court has never explicitly imposed a time
limit on the retroactivity of a tax statute’s application.”
Wiggins v. Commissioner, supra at 316. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has further opined that “the ‘harsh
and oppressive’ test * * * does not limit retroactivity to one
year, but instead requires a case-by-case analysis in which the
length of the period affected is but one factor to be
considered.” Id.
To summarize, we conclude that, to the extent petitioner
raises issues of retroactivity, application of the amendment to
section 104 would not violate the standards requiring a rational
purpose and reasonable period. The tests employed to evaluate
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