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unconstitutional. He concedes, as he stated in his last filing
with the Court, that “if the effective date . . . was Congress’
intent and does not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights,
then the acts taken by Respondent would be within the statutory
authority.”
The parties thus agree that, for purposes of these motions,
delays occurred in respondent’s handling of the case, and those
delays were due to “managerial” acts. The parties also agree
that petitioner would not be entitled to an abatement of interest
under old section 6404(e), but would be under new section
6404(e). We therefore need not untangle the parties’
contradictory positions on who and what caused how much delay;
and the case is ripe for decision on this disputed, and
apparently novel, legal issue.3
3 Petitioner’s concession also frees us of having to analyze
whether some of the delay was the result of what we might
consider ministerial acts under the old temporary regulations.
See Palihnich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-297 (IRS’s 11-
year failure to process amended returns after losing them was
“ministerial act” under sec. 301.6404-2T(b)(1), Temporary Proced.
& Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 30163 (Aug. 13, 1987)).
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